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IN T,HE SUPRE,ME COURT 
of the 
STATIE OF U'T'AH 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, also known 
as BILL CHRISTENSEN and CELESTE 
CHRISTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
EMERON CHRISTENSEN and KATH-
LEEN CHRISTENSEN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 
8966 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from the District Court of the SiXth Judicial 
District in and for the County of Sevier, State of Utah. 
HoNORABLE JoHN L. SEVY, JR., District Judge 
The Plaintiffs and Respondents will be referred to as 
"Respondents" and the Defendants and Appellants will be 
ref~rred to as "Appellants." 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
The Appellants' Statement of Facts is substantially 
accurate to the extent it has gone. However, Appellants 
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have omitted any reference to facts unfavorable to their 
position. In the first place, the Respondent William 
Christensen and the Appellant Emeron Christensen are 
brothers (R. 11). Both are farmers but William Chris-
tensen also does trucking work (R. 20). Prior to and 
during the spring of 1942 the Respondent William Chris-
tensen was the owner of a thirty-five-acre (actually 34.20 
acres) tract of land and seventeen and one-half shares 
of the Capital Stock of Elsinore Irrigation Company, 
used on the land, and Respondents also owned eleven and 
one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company, said 
land and water stock being mortgaged to The Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley (R. 12). Also, the home of the 
Respondents at Richfield, Utah, was mortgaged to The 
Federal Land Bank and Respondents had executed and 
delivered to said Bank a Deed to be held until the mort-
gage indebtedness was paid in full. The Appellant 
Emeron Christensen was farming, along with other prop-
erty, a fifteen-acre tract across the road kitty-corner 
from the William Christensen propert:~, oyrned of record 
by the Appellant Kathleen Christensen (R. 4). Twenty-
two and one-half shares of the Capital Stock of Sevier 
Valley Irrigation Company, ow·ned of record by the .Ap-
pellant Emeron Christensen, were then and had been 
used on said property since 1928 (R. 4 and 13). ~'-ppellant 
IDmeron Christensen had ·also been fanning two addition-
al tracts of land, one a two-ac.re piece and the other an 
eight-acre tract, title to which "\Yas acquired by hiinself 
and his wife as joint tenants (R .... t\..-38 and R. 15). These 
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two tracts will hereafter be referred to as the ten-acre 
tract. 
In the spring of 1942, William and Emeron Chris-
tensen made a verbal agreement to trade land and water, 
the details of which are as follows: 
Appellants were to pay off the indebtedness 
due The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley against 
Respondents' home and AppeHants were to convey 
to the Respondents the fifteen-acre tract of land, 
together with twenty-two and one-half shares of 
Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water. In re-
turn Respondents were to convey to Appellants 
the thirty-five acre tract of land and seventeen 
and one-half shares of water of the Elsinore Irri-
gation Canal Company (R. 17 and 18). At the 
same time and as a part of the same transaction 
Appellants agreed to sell to the Respondents the 
ten-acre tract of land for One Thousand Dollars 
(R. 18), and Respondents were to use on said land 
the eleven and onec.half shares of Sevier Valley 
Irrigation Company water which they already 
owned (R. 62). The sales price was payable in 
livestock and credits for hauling Emeron Chris-
tensen's beet pulp. Also, Respondent William 
Christensen hauled commodities for third persons 
and they paid the Appellants who were to credit 
the account of the Respondents (R. 92 and 93). 
Respondents were to pay the taxes and title to the 
ten acres was to pass to Respondents "right away'' 
(R. 19). The transaction was not to bear any 
interest (R. 62). 
Respondents immediately went into possession of the 
ten acres of land with Appellants' knowledge and ap-
proval. Respondents turned over to the Appellants two 
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cows, one bay mare, one black steer, three calves and two 
heifers at agreed valuations per animal and the Appel-
lants later sold the animals to third persons (R. 21 to 23). 
Beginning in the fall of 1942 and continuing through the 
spring of 1944 Respondent William Christensen hauled 
at an agreed valuation of $1.50 per ton, 170 tons of beet 
pulp from the Gunnison Sugar Company (Exhibit 1 and 
R. 97). From time to time Respondent also hauled com-
modities for third persons who paid the Appellants for 
the hauling work. The value of the livestock and the haul-
ing services was $684.00, leaving a balance of $316.00 
payable. 
In June of 1942 Appellants delivered to Respondents 
the Deed to their Richfield, Utah, home and the Abstracts 
of 'Title on the ten-acre tract (Exhibits 2 and 3), together 
with a Deed to the fifteen-acre tract. Appellants assured 
Respondents that they would complete the transaction 
for the sale of the ten-acre tract and that they would 
secure and deliver to the Respondents a Certificate for 
twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier 'Talley Irriga-
tion Company Water (R. 29 to 31). Respondents delivered 
to Appellants at this time their Deed to the thirty-five 
acre tract of property and a certificate for seventeen and 
one-half shares of water of Elsinore Irrigation Canal 
Company. 
During the course of more than hYo years thereafter 
Appellant Emeron ·Christensen assured the Respondents 
on numerous occasions that, with respect to the prepara-
tion and delivery of a Deed to the ten acres of property 
and the Certificate for twenty-two and one-half shares of 
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Sevier Valley Irrigation Company Water Stock, "I will 
have it all fixed up for you right away,'' using as an ex-
cuse for his failure to execute and deliver the said Deed 
and Water Certificate, that he was then too busy with 
other matters (R. 32 to 35). Emeron Christensen did not, 
however, keep his word. 
In November of 1955, Respondents offered to pay 
Appellants in cash the balance of the purchase price but 
Appellants again declined to accept the balance payable 
or to deliver the Deed and Water Stock Certificate (R. 
38). It was at this time, however, that Appellant Emeron 
Christensen asked Respondent William Christensen to 
lease the land to him but Respondent William Christensen 
could not oblige him as the property was then leased to 
third person (R. 38 and 39). 
In the early spring of 1956 Appellants dispossessed 
the Respondents from the ten acres, claiming that the 
property was theirs and that the agreement for sale and 
purchase was cancelled (R. 42). 
When the Respondent William Christensen took pos-
session of the ten acres it had not been fertilized for 
several years and the fences were down and the soil was 
rough and hilly with numerous high and low spots. An 
old road passed the property but it was impassible (R. 
44). Respondent manured the property (R. 49) and 
planted sugar beets. Again in 1944 and 1945 the ground 
was manured and planted to beets and grain (R. 48). In 
the winter of 1945 and the spring of 1946 Respondent had 
the land leveled (Exhibit 4) and the irrigation system 
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was changed for better water coverage. Respondents' 
cost was $385.00 (R. 52 :and 53). The fences on the North 
and West side of the property were repaired and posts 
and wires replaced. Fencing was maintained by the Re-
spondent until he leased the property in 1946 (R. 54). In 
1944 Respondent vVilliam Christensen spent three weeks 
of his time helping with repairs to the road to the prop-
erty in order to make it usable (R. 55). Beginning with 
the crop year 1946 Respondents leased the property to 
third persons who planted crops, fertilized the land and 
maintained and improved the fencing (R. 55). Regarding 
the fifteen-acre tract sold to Respondents by Appellants 
and upon which they received a Deed, but no Certificate 
for twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley 
Water, Respondent William Christensen and his Lessees 
farmed the ground each year from 1942 to 1955 and used 
thereon the twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier 
Valley Irrigation Company water that .. A ..ppellant had 
previously used on the ground. In the spring of 1956 the 
Appellant Emeron Christensen ordered the Irrigation 
Company not to turn the water on to the land (R. 57 to 
59). 
Respondents' Lessee, Tahnage Christensen, testified 
that he leased and farmed the ten acres and the fifteen 
acres after 1951 and that he used thereon a total of thirty-
three and one-half shares of water (twenty-two :and one-
half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company from 
the fifteen acre tract and eleven shares of Sevier Y alley 
Irrigation Con1pany water from the ten acre tract) .... 1\..p-
pellant knew Anderson was renting the land and the 
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water but never objected until1956 when he dispossessed 
Anderson (R. 77 to 79). 
Respondent Celeste Christensen testified that she 
personally paid the taxes on the ten acres each year frmn 
1942 to 1955 (Exhibit 5 and R. 98 and 99). Mrs. Christen-
sen also testified about the meetings of June, 1942, when 
the Abstracts of Title on the ten acres were delivered to 
Respondents, and the meeting of November, 1955, at Ap-
pellants' home at Elsinore, Utah, on both of which occa-
sions Appellants assured the Respondents that Appel-
lants would see that the Deed to the ten acres of land and 
the Certificate for the twenty-two and one-half shares of 
Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water were prepared 
and delivered "one of these days as soon as we have time" 
(R. 101 to 103). Mrs. Christensen kept an accurate record 
of the animals turned over to Appellants together with 
their valuations, together with the hauling of commodi-
ties for third person (Exhibit 6 and R. 106 to 110). 
Appellant Emeron Christensen, in his testimony, 
flatly and absolutely denied having any conversations 
with Respondents about the foregoing matters or making 
any agreement whatever for the sale of the ten acres of 
land or the twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier 
Valley Irrigation Company water (R. 119 and 120) but 
contended that he merely permitted the Respondents to 
use the ten acres of land and the twenty-two and one-half 
shares of water between 1942 and 1954 (R. 120 and 121). 
Appellant Emeron Christensen further denied that he 
had delivered the Abstracts of Title on the ten acres of 
land to the Respondents (R. 121) or that the Respondents 
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had delivered to him any animals (R. 122). Appellant 
acknowledged that the Respondent had hauled a quantity 
of coal and beet pulp for him but he contended that the 
Respondents had been paid in full (R. 123). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE DE1CISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW. 
(a) The Evidence Was Entirely Sufficient To 
Prove The Existence Of A Contract As To Both Causes 
of Action And To Justify A Decree Of Specific Perform-
ance. 
(b) The Contract Relied Upon As To Both Causes 
Of Action Was Not Barred By The Statute Of Frauds. 
(e) The Second Cause of Action Was Not Barred 
By The Statute Of Limitations. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
RECEIVING FROM COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS AND 
RESPONDENTSLETTERSANDSTATEMENTSAFTERTHE 
TRIAL OF THE CASE. 
POINT III. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMTTTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGU~IENT ON POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DgCISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW. 
(a) 'The Evidence 'Yas Entirely Sufficient To 
Prove The Existence Of A Contract As. To Both Causes 
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of Action And To Justify A Decree Of Specific Perform-
ance. 
Respondents agree with the principal of law estab-
lished in Montgomery v. Berrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569, 
cited by Appellants, that the Plaintiffs seeking the speci-
fic performance of a parol contract must show a clear, 
mutual understanding and a positive assent to the terms 
of the Contract. See also Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 
P. 768. 
It has been said that a ·Contract is a transaction in 
which each party comes under an obligation to the other 
and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is promised 
by the other. Dartmouth College. v. W oodwar.d, 4 Wheat 
(U.S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629. Expressed in its simplest terms, 
the reciprocal duties of Appellants and Respondents 
were the following: 
APPELLANTS' D,UTIES 
1. To pay off the existing debt of the Re-
spondents to The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley 
and to deliver to Respondents the Deed held by 
the Bank. 
'2. To convey to Respondents the 15-acre 
tract of property -and 22lf2 shares of stock in 
Sevier Valley Irrigation Company. 
3. To convey to Respondent the 10.00-acre 
tract of property upon payment of the purchase 
price of $1000.00. 
RESPONDENTS' DUTIES 
1. To convey to Appellants the 35.00-acre 
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tract of real estate and 17lf2 shares of Elsinore 
Irrigation Canal Company water stock. 
2. To pay the Appellants $1000.00 for the 
10.00-acre tract of property either in cash or in 
services or other commodities. 
Appellants attempt to separate and to detach from 
the other mutual duties Appellants' No. 3 and Respond-
ents' No. 2 duties listed above. It is signifieant to note, 
however, that all of the Respondents' evidence goes to the 
proposition that there was but one agreement and one 
contract embracing all of the duties and rights of the 
parties. Appellants chose to flatly and unequivocably 
deny the existence of any agreement, duty or responsi-
bility, but the irrefutable facts are that the Appellants 
did pay The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley $1,832.50 
to release its lien on Respondents' property; Appellants 
did secure and deliver to Respondents the Deed to their 
Richfield, Utah, home; and Appellants did convey to the 
Respondent Celeste Christensen the fifteen-acre tract of 
land above referred to. It is obvious, therefore, that the 
Appellants from the very beginning had a clear under-
standing of their duties, as far as they chose to perform 
them. They proceeded with haste to perform all of Duty 
No. 1 and half of Duty No. ~. Also they permitted Re-
spondents to perforrn their Duty No. 1 and substantially 
to perform their Duty No. 2. At no ti1ne did Appellants 
doubt the existence of Contract rights against the Re-
spondents and it ill behooves the1n now, after realizing 
substantially all of the benefits frmn the Contract, to 
urge equity to rleelare that no Contract exiMed. 
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We submit that every necessary element of a Con-
tract is clearly established by the Respondents' case. 
There is neither uncertainty nor indefiniteness as to 
any of its terms. The crux of Appellants' argument ap-
pears to be that in no event can a Contract be established 
because the Appellant Emeron Christensen denied in his 
testimony that none existed. Ris actions would strongly 
indicate otherwise. Brotherly affection would not move 
even Emeron Christensen to pay The Federal Land Bank 
of Berkeley $1,832.50 without a good reason. Nor would 
Appellants have delivered to the Respondents the Ab-
stracts of Title on the ten-acre tract if Respondents were 
only "using the land" until Appellants wanted it. Fur-
ther, it is difficult to imagine Appellants permitting 
Respondents to use twenty-two and one-half shares of 
Appellants' water for 13 years unless Appellants well 
knew that the land and the water had been sold to the 
Respondents. We suggest to the Court that the reason 
why the Appellants suddenly contended that there was no 
Contract relating to the ten acres of land and the Twenty-
two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Com-
pany water relates to the general drought in South Cen-
tral Utah beginning in 1955 and the fact the Appellants' 
son had recently purchased from Appellants' attorney a 
tract of realty abutting on the ten acres in this law suit 
and the Appellant Emeron Christensen and his son "are 
farming together" (R. 137). 
The fact that Respondents' agreement with the Ap-
pellants enabled thern to pay for the ten acres over an 
unspecified period of time does not, as Appellants con-
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tend, reduce the agreement to something less than a con-
tract. The authorities are to the effect that where •a Con-
tract to render services is silent as to the time of payment 
for the services, payment is due when the services have 
been rendered. See 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 304 
and the cases cited in 2 A.L.R. 519. 
Also: The Synopses of the following cases from Vol. 
3, A.L.R. Digest, page 7 43 are significant : 
The term "any time'' used in a contract, al-
though a relative term subject to variation in 
meaning according to the facts and circumstances 
of the case, is nevertheless to be given its ordin-
ary meaning, in the absence of special circum-
stances indicating that it was not intended to have 
such meaning. 
Haworth v. Hubbard, 220 Indiana 611, 44 N.E. 2d 
967. 
In the absence of agreement as to payment 
for work under a building contract no payment 
can be demanded until the work is substantially 
performed. 
Stewart v. Newbury, 220 NY 379,115 NE 984. 
Thus it appears that as a 1natter of law Respondents 
could not have required Appellants to deliver the Deed 
to the ten-acre tract until the $1000.00 purchase price had 
been paid. But the more ilnportant consideration is that 
even so, such an agreement is perfectly valid and enforce-
able, if not within the Statute of Frauds. 
fn answer to Appellants' emnplaint that all·of the 
tenns and conditions of the Contract of the parties are 
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garnered from Respondents' case "with not so much as 
one receipt or the scratch of a pen to show the existence 
of the Contract by the Defendants or the credit of pay-
ment thereon of services or livestock by the Defendants•' 
to quote Appellants' Brief at page 13 thereof, we can only 
say that it served Emeron Christensen's purpose not to 
keep a receipt or a record of any kind. In the beginning 
Emeron and William Christensen dealt with one another 
at something less than arm's length and appeared to en-
joy one another's respect and confidence (R. 66). It was 
imprudent though not unnatural nor uncommon that they 
did not reduce their agreement to writing and keep ade-
quate records. But the lower court concluded that Appel-
lants' unblinking deni,al of the entire affair as it related to 
the sale of the ten acres of land and the twenty-two and 
one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company 
water stock simply did not square with convincing and en-
tirely believable testimony and evidence of Respondents' 
case. We submit that the Respondents told the strict 
truth at the trial as it related to their transaction or 
they did not. The lower court, being in a position to 
judge the demeanor of the witnesses as well as other 
factors, found that a contract did exist, that the rights, 
duties and responsibilities thereof were not severable 
and that the contract was in every respect capable of 
specific performance. Other than Appellant Emeron 
Christensen's complete and general denial, there is abso-
lutely no evidence to the contrary. Further, we have noted 
with interest that the Appellant, Emeron Christensen, 
did not call upon his wife, Kathleen Christensen, to testi-
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fy in the case as a corroborative witness to the fact that 
there was no agreement relating to the 10 acres of prop-
erty and to the 22lf2 shares of Sevier Valley water and 
that the abstracts of title were not delivered to Respond-
ents. 
She was present at all of the meetings with Respond-
ents except for the initial meeting in the spring of 1942 
and was also present in the courtroom during the trial 
of this case. On this state of the record this ·Court ought 
not to set aside the lower Court's decision. 
"This Court is authorized by the State Con-
stitution to review ·the Findings of the Trial Court 
in equity cases, but the findings of the trial Courts 
on conflicting evidence will not be set aside un-
less it manifestly appears that the Court has mis-
applied proven facts or made findings clearly 
against ·the weight of the evidence." 
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313. 
(b) The Contract Relied Upon As To Both Causes 
Of Action Was Not Barred By The Statute Of Frauds. 
While it is at once apparent that the Contract be-
tween Appellants and Respondents was entirely oral, 
nevertheless Respondents rely on the saving grace of 
Section 25-5-8, Utah Code Annotruted, 1953, which reads: 
25-5-8. RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PEHFOR~l­
ANCE NOT AFFECTED. - Nothing in this 
Chapter contained shall be construed to abridge 
the powers of courts to compel the specific per-
formance of agreen1ents in ease of part perform-
ance thereof. 
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Thus it is well settled in Utah that a sufficient part 
performance by the purchaser under a parol contract for 
the sale and purchase of real estate removes the contract 
from the operation of the statute of frauds and authorizes 
the Court to decree the specific performance of the agree~ 
ment by the vendor. 
In Utah, the leading cases on this proposition are 
Price v. Lloyd, supra; and Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 
575, 206 P. 262. See also Lynch v. Co·viglio, 17 Utah 106, 
53 P. 983. 
The true basis of the doctrine of part performance, 
according to the overwhelming weight of authority, lies 
in principles of equitable estoppel and frraud. It would be 
a fraud upon the Respondents if the Appellants were 
permitted to escape performance of their part of the oral 
agreement after they have permitted the Respondents to 
substantially perform in reliance upon the agreement. 
In the ILargreaves v. Burton case, supra, the Utah Su-
preme Court quoted with approval the following language 
from the Price v. Lloyd decision, which language origin-
ally came from Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Con-
tracts, 2nd Edition, paragraph 145, to-wit: 
"When a verbal contract has been made, and 
one party has knowingly aided or permitted the 
other to go on and do acts in part performance of 
the Agreement, acts done in full reliance upon such 
Agreement as a valid rand. binding Contract, and 
which would not have been done without the agree-
ment, and which are of such a nature as to change 
the relation of the parties, and to prevent a re-
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storation to their former condition and an ade-
quate compensation for the loss of a legal judg-
ment for damages, then it would be a vertual 
fraud in the first party to interpose the statute 
of frauds as a bar to the completion of the con-
tract, and thus to secure for himself all of the 
benefit of the acts already done in part perform-
ance, while the other party would not only lose all 
the advantage from the bargain, but would be left 
without adequate remedy for his failure or com-
pensation for what he had done in pursuance of 
it. To prevent the success of such a palpable 
fraud, equity interposes under these circum-
stances, and compels an entire completion of the 
contract by decreeing its specific execution." 
Now here have we been able to locate a more ex-
haustive and authoritative collation of authorities on the 
doctrine of part performance than that found in the an-
notation in volume 101 of American Law Reports begin-
ning at page 923 entitled "Doctrine of Part Performance 
in Suits for Specific Perfonnance of Parol Contracts To 
Convey Real Property." Particular acts of part perform-
ance generally recognized as sufficient to take an oral 
contract out of the clutches of the Statutes of Frauds 
are there catalogued under the general headings of pos-
session, possession coupled with other acts, ilnprove-
ments, payment of the purchase price, payn1ent of taxes, 
etc. Not all of these acts are required in every case, and 
what constitutes perfornutnee must depend upon the par-
ticuar faets of each case. See Veum v. Sheeran, 95 :L\finn. 
315, 104 N.W. 135. 
~ The lHah cases above cited adopt the rule that pos-
session of the property must be coupled with some other 
-
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act or acts of part performance, depending on the spe-
cific and particular circumstances of the case. In the 
instant case there can be no doubt of the fact that Re-
spondents went into possession of the property and that 
they and their tenants and agents held possession for 
fourteen years, openly ~and notoriously, pursuant to the 
contract and exclusive of the rights of Appellants. Their 
possession was continuous and there was neither aban-
donment, surrender nor interruption of possession. All 
this was accomplished with the knowledge and consent 
of the Appellants. And in addition, Respondents also 
made valuable and permanent improvements upon the 
property consisting of fertilizing and cultivating the land, 
leveling of the ground, improvements to existing ditches, 
the construction of a new irrigation system, construction 
of new fencing and maintenance of old fencing and road 
improvements. All of these improvements were refer-
able exclusively to the contract and were such as would 
not have been performed except for the contract. See 
Pr,ice v. Lloyd and Hargreaves v. Burton} supra. 
In the case of Drake v. Smith} 14 Utah 35, 45 P. 1006 
and Karren v. Rainey} 30 Utah 7, 83 P. 333, this court held 
that the erection and maintenance of fences in addition 
to other improvements on the property was sufficient to 
constitute part performance of an oral contract for the 
sale and purchase of land. 
In Bracken v. Chadburn} 55 Utah 430, 185 P. 1021, 
this Court also held that the construction and mainten-
ance of irrigation ditches and canals was sufficient part 
performance of an oral contract to convey property. 
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In Hazen v. Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 P. 1097, this 
court held that payment of the purchase price when 
coupled with possession and the making of valuable 
improvements in reliance upon the oral contract consti-
tuted a sufficient part performance to entitle the vendor 
to specific performance. See also collected cases from 
other jurisdiction on this point at Note 88, 101 A.L.R. 
1056. 
We also call to the court's 'attention the recent case 
of In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595, 
wherein this Court held that where there was no memo-
randum reduced to writing, but the deceased had accepted 
the consideration and surrendered possession there was 
sufficient part performance to avoid the statute of frauds 
and the deeeased 's heirs and successors in title and inter-
est should not be allowed to repudiate the oral contract. 
It is acknowledged in the instant case that the Re-
spondent had not paid all of the purchase price at the 
time they were dispossessed by the Appellants, but the 
difference between payment of all and a major portion 
of the purchas~ price would appear to be imn1aterial in 
view of this court's decision in the recent case of In re 
Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278, wherein this 
court held that the evidence supported a finding of part 
performance where the Defendant took possession of the 
property, made improvements thereto and paid half of 
the purchase price and had tendered the ren1aining pur-
chase price to the Vendor. 
Although we can find no specific Utah authorities 
directly in point relating to fertilizing the ground, culti-
vation of the land, ground leveling work and road im-
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provements, we refer to the court to the collation of 
American authorities on these points in 33 A.L.R. begin-
ning at page 1489 in the annotation entitled "Character 
and Extent of Improvements Necessary To Constitute 
Part Performance," wherein the authorities hold that the 
making of such improvements coupled with such other 
acts as the particular circumstances of the individual 
case require, constitute sufficient part performance to 
justify a court in decreeing specific performance of an 
oral contract for the s:ale and purchase of land. Also, 
while it is admittedly true that the payment of taxes alone 
is not sufficient part performance, we refer the court's 
attention to the cases cited in Notes 67, 68 and 69 on page 
1109 of 101 A.L.R. holding that payment of taxes, when 
added to other acts of part performance, will suffice to 
take a contract for the sale and purchase of real property 
out of the statute of frauds. 
Appellants in their Breif go to some length to belittle 
the Respondents' acts of part performance. They allege 
that Respondents' possession of the property was not 
under the Contract, but rather, it was out of the goodness 
of Emeron ·Christensen's heart. Also, at page 17 of Ap-
pellants' Brief it is asserted with apparent seriousness 
that this case does not involve actual possession and 
permanent improvements. We can only reply that the 
undisputed facts of the case show possession in every 
sense of the word and the weight of legal authority estab-
lishes that the improvements made were both permanent 
and substantial. 
In a final effort to whittle down the stature of Re-
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spondents' case, Appellants cite the dicta in the Price vs. 
Lloyd case supra and the case of Moffat vs. Hoffman, 
61 Utah 482, 214 P. 308 that "where the improvements 
do not exceed the rental value of the property they will 
not be regarded as of such a substantial value and charac-
ter as to constitute part performance so as to take the 
case out of the statute" (quotation from the Price vs. 
Lloyd case, supra). A careful reading of both of these 
cases will show that any excess of value of the use of the 
land over the value of the improvements is not the test 
in determining the character and permanency of the 
improvements, but is only one of the circumstances to be 
taken into consideration in determining whether the pur-
chaser who made the improvements suffered a loss or 
injury. In the instant case the record will show that when 
the reasonable value of the Respondent William Christen-
sen's time and effort is given proper consideration and 
is added to the value of the fertilizing of the land, the 
cultivation thereof, the leveling of the ground, the im-
provements made to existing ditches, the construction of 
new irrigation ditches, new fencing and the maintenance 
of old fencing and road improvements, they far exceed 
Appellants' estimate of rental value of $40.00 per acre 
and perfectly illustrate the reason why the doctrine of 
part performance was invoked by the Courts of equity, 
to-wit, to prevent injury and damage from being inflicted 
upon one who relied in good faith upon an oral contract. 
No judgment for da1nages could adequately recon1pense 
the Respondents. 
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(c) The Second Cause of Action Was Not Barred 
By The Statute Of Limitations. 
Appellants apparently concede that Respondents' 
First Cause of Action is not barred by the Statutes of 
Limitations since they did not raise the bar of the statute 
thereto. However, on the theory that Respondents' Second 
Cause of Action is entirely separate, distinct and a thing 
apart from Respondents' First Cause of Action, Appel-
lants contend that the Second Cause of Action is barred 
by Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
All of the evidence in the case establishes the fact 
that the contract for the sale to Respondents of the 
twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irriga-
tion Company Water was part and parcel of the larger 
contract of the Respondents and Appellants of April, 
1942 ____________ that is, unless Appellants' general denial is to 
be believed. Under the terms of the Contract, Appellants 
were not obligated to completely perform until Respond-
ents has performed. Respondents had tendered their com-
plete performance as late as the fall of 1955 (R. 104) and 
were ready, willing and able to perform their part of the 
bargain in the spring of 1956 when they were dispossessed 
(R. 42). Thus Respondents' Cause of Action for specific 
performance as to the twenty-two and one-half shares 
of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water did not ma-
ture until the Spring or 1956. It was not different in any 
degree or extent from the time Respondents' First Cause 
of Action matured, and as the First Cause of Action was 
not barred by section 78-12-25 of Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, neither was the Second Cause of Action. 
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The Whvtehill vs. Lowe case, 10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589, 
cited by Appellants in their Brief is clearly distinguish-
able from the instant case both as to the statute and the 
facts and is no authority for raising the bar of limitations 
in the instant case. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
RECEIVING FROM COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS AND 
RESPONDENTSLETTERSANDSTATEMENTSAFTERTHE 
TRIAL OF THE CASE. 
VVhile it may have been somewhat irregular for the 
Court to receive from counsel for both parties informa-
tion not formally presented to the Court in open session, 
nevertheless, no prejudice resulted to the Appellants. In 
the first place the attorney for the Appellants was at all 
times advised by the Court and Counsel for the Respond-
ents of the Court's requests but Appellants' counsel at 
all times, failed, refused and neglected to cooperate in any 
way in assembling the requested information (R. 177). 
Also, Appellants' counsel received copies of all of the 
letters sent to the Trial Court (see endorsements at the 
bottom of the letters (R. 173 to 175), ~and Appellants~ 
counsel could have objected to the 1natters set forth in 
the letter of Respondents' counsel dated :Jiay 23, 1958 
(R.175) if he had wanted to do so. He did not so object. 
The Trial Judge's Certificate (R. 187 and 188) 
states: 
"That in arriving at a decision in this case 
the Court took the position as stated fron1 the 
bench in open court at the hearing on the Motion 
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for a new trial that the issues in the case were 
substantially as set forth in the letter of counsel 
for the Defendants (Appellants here) dated May 
20, 1958 (R. 170) ..... , and in reaching said deci-
sion the rmdersigned did not take into considera-
tion any of the matters contained and set forth 
in the letters of cormsel hereinabove referred but 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Decree of the Court dated the 16th 
day of J rme, A.D. 1958, were based solely upon the 
files and records of the case and upon the evidence 
and testimony of the trial on October 21, 1957. 
This Certificate is made for the purpose of 
iinplementing and completing the record of this 
cause since the above and foregoing statements 
were made by the undersigned from the bench in 
open court at the hearing on Defendants' Motion 
for New Trial on the 22nd day of July, A.D. 1958. 
The said statements hereinabove referred to were 
not, however, taken down stenographically by the 
Court Recorder at the time they were made and 
uttered from the bench as said Court Reporter 
was temporarily absent from the Courtromn 
during the argument of counsel upon said Motion 
for New Trial." 
~\_ny technical error committed by the Court in re-
questing and receiving letters and statements from coun-
sel was harmless and resulted in no prejudice to the 
.Appellants. 
POINT III. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMfTTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellants' Motion for a New Trial (R. 170) was 
based on subsections (1) and (6) of Rule 59 A of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure relating to irregularity in the 
proceedings of the Court and insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the Court's decision. Respondents respectfully 
refer the Court to the Argument set forth under Points I 
and II hereof where these matters are dealt with in detail. 
For the reasons set forth under said arguments we 
assert that the Trial Court acted properly in denying 
Appellants' Motion for aNew Trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents urge this Court to uphold the decision 
of the lower court because said decision is fully supported 
by the record and no error prejudicial to Appellants has 
occurred in the proceedings below. 
It would be a virtual fraud upon the Respondents 
if the Appellants were now permitted to escape perform-
ance of their part of the oral contract after they had per-
mitted the Respondents to substantially perform their 
part of the agreement in reliance thereon. There can be 
no doubt from the record that the agreement of April, 
1942, existed, that its tenns \Yere in all respects exact, 
definite and fully capable of specific performance. Said 
agreement, by reason of its part perforn1ance is not 
within the statute of frauds nor has its enforcmnent been 
barred by the statute of limitations. Appellants would 
have the Court believe that all parts of the contract bene-
fiting them were real and enforceable but that the parts 
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thereof relating to the sale of the ten-acres of land and 
the twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley 
Irrigation Company Water Stock to the Respondents 
were figments of Respondents' imagination. The facts 
are otherwise. The result of the Appellants' present posi-
tion in this action is on its face so grossly inequitable 
as to be unconscionable. We submit that for all of the 
reasons heretofore stated the decision of the trial court 
should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By C~VEL MATTSSON 
JOHN T. VERNIEU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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